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TROY A. PAREDES* 
I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SARBANES-OXLEY  
Even with the recent run-up in stocks—as of mid-August of 2003, the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average had reached a 14-month high, climbing to 
9,428.90, and the Nasdaq Composite Index had reached a 16-month high 
at 1,761.111—the major stock indices remain significantly off their all-
time highs, which saw the Dow Jones Average eclipse 11,722 and the 
Nasdaq Composite top out at 5,048.2 Although a number of factors 
contributed to the stock market decline that started in 2000, including the 
bursting of the dot-com bubble, a softer economy than many expected, 
September 11 and the ongoing terrorist threat, and the wars in Afghanistan 
 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law in St. Louis. Special 
thanks are owed to Chris Bracey, Kathy Brickey, Scott Kieff, Ron King, and Joel Seligman for helpful 
comments and discussions that assisted in writing this Foreword. 
 1. E.S. Browning, Tech Stocks Reach High of Their Own, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2003, at C1. 
 2. See, e.g., Karen Talley, Small-Stock Focus: S&P SmallCap 600 Aims for All-Time High, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2003, at C8.  
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and Iraq, for purposes of this Symposium, one factor that weighed on 
stocks stands out: corporate scandal. Beginning with Enron in the fall of 
2001, a wave of corporate scandal crashed on the U.S. economy. In 
addition to Enron, the scandals involved companies such as WorldCom, 
Tyco, ImClone, Adelphia, and Global Crossing, to name a few, and 
ensnared leading financial institutions up and down Wall Street, along 
with major accounting firms, most notably the collapsed Arthur Andersen. 
As if the bona fide scandals that made the headlines were not enough to 
drag the markets down, a record number of earnings restatements in recent 
years—increasing steadily from 116 restatements in 1997, to 158 in 1998, 
234 in 1999, 258 in 2000, and to 305 in 2001 when the scandals began to 
break3—have cast further doubt on the governance practices, finances, and 
business plans of many companies.  
Broad and deep capital markets like the U.S. enjoys, where ownership 
and control are widely separated,4 depend on a healthy dose of investor 
confidence to convince investors to hand over trillions of dollars to 
directors and officers over whom they exercise relatively little influence. 
Although the nature of business is that some enterprises will succeed and 
others will fail, shareholders need to trust that the management team 
holding the company’s reins will run the business honestly, in good faith, 
with due care, and loyally—in short, in the best interests of the 
shareholders as opposed to in the best interests of the directors and 
officers. The gross abuses at what amounted to a handful of companies, 
given that there are approximately 14,000 public companies in the U.S., 
rocked investor confidence, resulting in a major selloff of equities and 
deep concerns market-wide. Investors understandably became skittish and, 
unable to distinguish the “good” companies from the “bad” ones, dashed 
to the sidelines with cash in hand as events at Enron, WorldCom, and 
elsewhere unfolded.  
The scandals at Enron et al. were particularly disconcerting because so 
many redundant checks and balances in our corporate governance system 
and capital markets failed. Where were the boards of directors? Why did 
securities analysts fail to ask the probing questions that top executives 
should have been pressed on? How did the auditors overlook the cooked 
books and the managed earnings? What about the lawyers structuring the 
 3. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN FINANCE 624 (3d ed. 2003) (citing 
SECURITIES INDUS. ASS’N , 2001 SECURITIES INDUSTRY FACT BOOK 48). 
 4. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
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deals and preparing the SEC filings? Why did the credit rating agencies 
wait so long to downgrade companies, in some cases maintaining a 
company’s investment-grade rating even after it was tarnished by scandal? 
These breakdowns have received a great deal of attention over the past two 
years, but investors themselves also deserve blame for becoming 
“irrationally exuberant” during the heady days of the bull markets that 
spanned the 1990s when people were willing to invest in any company if 
its stock price was higher today than yesterday or if it had “.com” after its 
name. Nor are the regulators above reproach. The SEC, for example, had 
not reviewed Enron’s annual report filings since 1997, prompting the 
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee to be very critical of the 
country’s top securities regulator,5 which had suffered from being 
underfunded and understaffed. Although the scandals affected relatively 
few companies overall, the seeming perfect storm of failures disillusioned 
many about the U.S. corporate governance system and the integrity of U.S. 
capital markets.6  
If the debacle at Enron had been an isolated incident, and could have 
been written off as the work of a few rotten apples at the company, 
perhaps Congress and the President would have sat tight. But once 
WorldCom broke in mid-June of 2002, it became clear that the U.S. 
corporate governance system was suffering from deep systemic flaws that 
needed to be fixed. As political pressures mounted, and as stock prices 
continued to plummet, something had to be done. In late July, within 
weeks of WorldCom breaking, Congress adopted, by a vote of 99 to 0 in 
the Senate and 423 to 3 in the House,7 what is proving to be the most 
important federal corporate governance and securities legislation since the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(“Sarbanes-Oxley”).8 Once President Bush signed the legislation into law 
 5. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., FINANCIAL 
OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS (Comm. Report Oct. 8, 2002); 
see also Jonathan Weil & John Wilke, Senate Panel Chides SEC for Falling Short in Enron 
Regulation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2002, at C1.  
 6. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Could Capitalists Actually Bring Down Capitalism?, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 30, 2002, § 4, at 1. 
 7. Corporate-Oversight Bill Passes, Eases Path for Investor Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., July 26, 
2002, at A1. 
 8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) [hereinafter 
Sarbanes-Oxley]. Even before Sarbanes-Oxley was signed into law, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission had taken a modest, but important, step that helped restore investor confidence and 
convince investors to return to the market. The SEC had issued an order requiring chief executives and 
chief financial officers to certify the accuracy of their companies’ financials by mid-August of 2002, 
bringing some integrity back to financial statements. Commission Order No. 4-460, Order Requiring 
the Filing of Sworn Statements Pursuant to Section 21(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
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on July 30, 2002,9 the markets were given at least some assurance that 
fraud and corporate abuses would not be tolerated. Indeed, in addition to 
the actions of Congress and the President, a number of cops on the beat 
stepped up their efforts to detect and root out corporate misdeeds: new 
listing standards were proposed for companies trading on the New York 
Stock Exchange or Nasdaq; the SEC engaged in wide-scale rulemaking 
and intensified its enforcement efforts; the Department of Justice began to 
focus its attention on corporate fraud; and New York Attorney General 
Eliot Spitzer assumed an unprecedented role in going after corporate 
corruption. Whether or not Sarbanes-Oxley’s substantive requirements are 
good policy that will result in better corporate governance and 
performance over the long haul—many remain concerned that Congress 
overreacted and that Sarbanes-Oxley regulates too much risk out of the 
market, is too costly to comply with, and has distracted senior executives 
from running their businesses10—one thing is certain: a strong regulatory 
response was needed, at least in the short run, to boost investor 
confidence.     
At its core, the historic Sarbanes-Oxley legislation is about promoting 
corporate transparency by ensuring full, fair, timely, and accurate 
disclosures. Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, mandates a host of new 
disclosures relating to, among other things, off-balance sheet transactions, 
insider stock transactions, internal control systems, and pro-forma 
financials; enacts tough new penalties for securities fraud; requires CEOs 
and CFOs to certify the financial statements of their companies; requires 
the SEC or, at its direction, the National Association of Securities Dealers 
or the stock exchanges to adopt rules to remedy conflicts of interest among 
(June 27, 2002). CEO and CFO certifications ultimately became part of Sarbanes-Oxley.  
 9. The final legislation was much closer to the original Sarbanes Bill than the original Oxley 
Bill. For a brief overview of the legislative process resulting in Sarbanes-Oxley, see Joel Seligman, No 
One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 474-
82 (2002). 
 10. This is a particular concern with Sarbanes-Oxley, given that it was adopted relatively quickly 
in a politically-charged environment. A strong regulatory response to the wave of scandal, however, 
appears to be consistent with historical practice. Stuart Banner has shown that the major changes in 
securities regulation over the past 300 years have typically followed market collapses. See Stuart 
Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation?: 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 
(1997).  
 For arguments favoring a market-based, as opposed to a regulatory-based, response to the 
scandals, thus calling into question the wisdom of Sarbanes-Oxley, see, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Enron: 
The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in ENRON: 
CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Bala Dharan & Nancy Rapoport eds., 2003); Larry E. 
Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2003).  
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss2/1
p229 Foreword Paredes book pages.doc 10/24/03   10:35 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
2003] FOREWORD 233 
 
 
 
 
 
securities analysts; regulates auditor conflicts of interest; and grants the 
SEC additional authority to regulate the professional conduct of attorneys 
practicing before the SEC. Perhaps the most important achievement of 
Sarbanes-Oxley is the creation of the new Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board. 
Although portions of Sarbanes-Oxley, such as Title I (which 
establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) and Title II 
(which regulates auditor independence) received careful attention in their 
crafting, much of the legislation was drafted hastily, in some cases at the 
eleventh hour. Given the overall haste of lawmakers to do something in 
response to the scandals and the losses that capital and labor alike 
suffered, Congress, on the whole, ultimately took quick action, especially 
given the magnitude of the reforms; and in so doing, Congress fastened on 
particular parts of the mandatory disclosure regime that the scandals 
brought to the fore and in many instances, simply called for more 
disclosure. What Congress did not have time to do, in light of the exigent 
circumstances, political pressures, and falling stock prices, was study the 
federal mandatory disclosure regime and its enforcement more 
comprehensively. This matters, because federal securities regulation is 
best understood and analyzed as a complex system and not as comprising 
a bunch of independent parts that can be tweaked or even overhauled on a 
one-off basis to create an effective regulatory scheme.11 It is not too late, 
though, to pick up where Congress left off by continuing to take a hard 
look at how we regulate our securities markets, especially since the SEC is 
still considering a number of important reforms. This Symposium takes a 
useful step in the direction of a comprehensive review of the mandatory 
disclosure system in the aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley.  
II. A MORE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH 
The goal of the mandatory disclosure regime of the federal securities 
laws is to promote capital market integrity and the efficient allocation of 
 11. For more on a “systems” approach that views corporate governance and securities regulation 
as comprising complementary parts that fit together to create a whole that is greater than the sum of its 
parts, see, e.g., Masahiko Aiko, The Japanese Firm as a System of Attributes: A Survey and Research 
Agenda, CEPR PUBLICATION NO. 288 (1992); Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional 
Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001); Paul Milgrom & John 
Roberts, Complementarities and Systems: Understanding Japanese Economic Organization, 9 
ESTUDIOS ECONOMICOS 3 (1994); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1145 
(1998); Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. 
Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer, WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2003); see generally Lynn M. 
LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 479 (1997). 
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capital by ensuring that investors have the information they need to make 
informed investment decisions. Disclosure serves a second important 
purpose, which is to encourage management to run the business well by 
shining light on mismanagement and self-dealing and by giving investors 
the information they need to make informed decisions when exercising 
their right to vote and when deciding whether or not to sue for breach of 
fiduciary duty. By giving investors key information for buying and selling 
securities and for holding directors and officers accountable, mandatory 
disclosure injects confidence into the market and obviates the need for 
more direct government involvement in corporate affairs, at either the state 
or federal level. 
This Symposium focuses on three aspects of mandatory disclosure: (1) 
what should be disclosed and how; (2) how should compliance with the 
federal securities laws be ensured; and (3) should issuers have more choice 
among competing regulatory regimes. For any disclosure-based regulatory 
regime to be effective, the information that is disclosed must be good in 
that it is accurate and complete. Incomplete or fraudulent information is 
worse than no information at all, and too little information can leave 
investors wanting. Simply the perception of inadequate disclosure can put 
investors ill at ease. The need for quality disclosures explains why so 
much dismay was expressed at the accounting conflicts of interest that 
appear to have compromised the independence of many auditors charged 
with signing off on company financials. But a disclosure regime depends 
on more than just good information. It equally depends on the information 
being put to good use by investors, securities analysts, portfolio managers, 
brokers, and others participating in securities markets. “User” conflicts of 
interest were another problem contributing to the recent scandals, as, for 
example, securities analysts that investors rely on as key “filters” of 
information issued biased research reports and recommendations in order 
to curry favor from companies that were current or potential investment 
banking clients.   
The disclosure of information and its digestion are just part—albeit an 
important part—of an effective mandatory disclosure regime. The 
effective public and private enforcement of the federal securities laws is 
also key. Strong enforcement is needed not only to ensure that the 
mandated disclosures are forthcoming, but also to hold the “gatekeepers,” 
such as investment bankers, securities analysts, credit rating agencies, 
accountants, and lawyers, accountable to better ensure the integrity of the 
information that is disclosed and that early warning signs of fraud or other 
corporate abuses are detected and hopefully headed off. In the 
handwringing over what caused the scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and 
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elsewhere, some argued that a dampened risk of legal liability—as a result 
of, among other things, the heightened pleading standards of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 that make it harder for plaintiffs 
to survive a motion to dismiss a securities fraud claim12 and the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.13 that there is no private right of action for 
aiding and abetting securities fraud—set the stage for corporate and 
accounting abuses. Another camp responded that the laws on the books 
were adequate to stem the abuses, and that few, if any, new laws were 
warranted in reaction to Enron and the other scandals; rather, regulators 
simply needed to enforce the extant laws more rigorously. Sarbanes-Oxley 
ultimately enacted several new enforcement-related provisions, including a 
new provision prohibiting securities fraud, one extending the statute of 
limitations for private rights of actions, and stiffer criminal sanctions. 
Congress did not, however, consider easing constraints on private 
litigation, such as by softening the PSLRA’s heightened pleading 
requirements or overturning Central Bank.  
Perhaps the quintessence of a comprehensive approach to the study of 
federal securities regulation is to challenge the basic premise—in other 
words, should the federal government have a near-monopoly on regulating 
our securities markets?14 This question is an outgrowth of the earlier 
debate between proponents of mandatory disclosure and those who argued 
that capital market pressures are adequate to induce companies to 
voluntarily disclose information investors want. Although as a matter of 
positive law the mandatory versus voluntary disclosure debate has been 
settled in favor of mandatory disclosure since the 1930s, the debate has 
resurrected itself in recent years in the form of issuer choice. The issuer-
choice debate centers less on whether or not there should be mandatory 
disclosure at all, and instead on whether or not issuers should have more 
choice among competing regulatory regimes. The debate has particular 
relevance post-Sarbanes-Oxley, as the federal securities laws in the U.S. 
have become even more demanding. Advocates of issuer choice argue that 
companies should be able to choose the securities law regime of the 
 12. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1278-85 (4th 
ed. 2001). 
 13. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 14. States, of course, also have a role to play in securities regulation, although the federal 
government, through the SEC, is the dominant securities regulator in the U.S. For more on important 
recent developments in state securities law, see Joel Seligman, The New Uniform Securities Act, 81 
WASH. U. L.Q. 243 (2003). 
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federal government, any state, or any foreign country.15 Some take issuer 
choice further to include the possibility of allowing issuers to choose to be 
regulated by stock exchanges, as opposed to (rather than in addition to) the 
regulatory regime of any state, federal, or foreign government. At bottom, 
issuer choice proponents claim that investors can “price” a regulatory 
regime just as they can “price” a company’s financials and overall 
business strategy. Issuer choice, it is said, gives both companies and 
investors more options and is thus more efficient than a one-size-fits-all 
mandatory federal securities law regime. Issuer choice rests on the basic 
observation, which is hard to dispute, that not all issuers are the same and 
not all investors are the same; different issuers and investors are sure to 
have different preferences for disclosure and enforcement regimes. The 
major selloff of U.S. equities that followed on the heels of Enron and the 
other scandals, as well as the various market-based reforms that have been 
urged on companies, investment banks, accounting firms, and others, 
bolster the issuer choice position, suggesting that capital markets are 
“pricing” corporate governance more today than ever. In fact, Institutional 
Shareholder Services, GovernanceMetrics International, Standard & 
Poor’s, and others have started grading the corporate governance 
structures of companies, just as Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s grade their 
debt.16 Critics of issuer choice counter that regulatory competition will 
result in too little disclosure and enforcement and ultimately a “race to the 
bottom,” as competing jurisdictions relax their regulatory regimes in order 
to convince issuers to opt in. Indeed, the alternative read on the recent 
scandals is that more regulation is needed to protect the markets from 
themselves and from corporate insiders.        
 15. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR 
SECURITIES REGULATION (2002); Stephen J. Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based 
Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279 (2000); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, 
International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855 (1997); 
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of 
Securities Regulation, 71 CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a 
Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498 (1997); Merritt B. Fox, 
Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 1335 (1999); Merritt B. Fox, The Securities Globalization Disclosure Debate, 78 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 567 (2000); Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEOR. INQ. IN L. (2001); Roberta 
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 
(1998); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997); Roberta Romano, 
The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEOR. INQ. IN L. 1 (2001); 
Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to Markets?: A Political Economy of Issuer Choice in 
International Securities Regulation, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1363 (2002). 
 16. See, e.g., http://governancemetrics.com/(gu3yaan4lw1ofd55tsqjxk55)/Default.aspx; 
http://www.isscgq.com/abouttheratings.htm; http://www.governance.standardandpoors.com. 
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In his article in this Symposium, Professor Cox17 focuses on reforming 
the financial reporting system of U.S. securities markets to ensure that the 
financial information companies disclose is accurate. As he notes, 
financial fraud was at the heart of the scandals prompting Congress to 
adopt Sarbanes-Oxley, and the number of earnings restatements, although 
not necessarily rising to the level of fraud, has skyrocketed in recent years. 
What is responsible for this “financial maelstrom”? According to Cox, 
“U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) have become too 
rule-oriented.” It is, therefore, too easy for companies, with the 
acquiescence of their auditors, to comply with the letter of GAAP while 
offending its spirit. (Of course, many of the scandals, such as those at 
Enron and WorldCom, involved blatant fraud.) In Cox’s words, “[T]he 
reasoning is that the abundance of technical rules leads naturally to the 
trees obscuring the vision of the dominating forest.” At bottom, the fix 
Cox offers is more independence. Not only does he support the new 
requirements mandating that public companies have entirely independent 
audit committees, consistent with the monitoring role of the board of 
directors, but he supports other measures, including the new Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board, that further ensure auditor 
independence and the integrity of our financial reporting system. Cox is 
hopeful that, as a result of these and other financial reporting reforms, the 
broad principle of “fair presentation of the reporting firm’s financial 
performance and position” will prevail over mere technical compliance 
with GAAP. 
Professor Macey, in his contribution to this Symposium,18 considers 
another side of the disclosure coin. In addition to the “supply side” of 
disclosure (i.e., the production, formatting, and dissemination of 
information) that Cox focuses on, Macey points out that there is a 
“demand side” of disclosure (i.e., the interpretation of information and its 
translation into trading decisions). Macey argues that demand-side 
problems were the primary factor leading to Enron’s demise and to the 
other corporate scandals. As he explains, “The Enron collapse 
demonstrates . . . that the ‘sunlight’ that disclosure brings about is useful 
only if market mechanisms are in place that are capable of observing and 
interpreting the information that the sunlight brings into view.” In terms of 
 17. James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and the Metrics 
for Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301 (2003). 
 18. Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate 
Concerning the Relative Efficiency of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329 
(2003). 
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demand-side reforms—Sarbanes-Oxley primarily focuses on the supply-
side—Macey proposes that “tax and other financial incentives” should be 
given to short sellers and to traders in single stock futures. This would not 
only encourage greater scrutiny of disclosures but would also reduce the 
“social stigma” associated with betting against a company or the market as 
a whole by taking a short position. Macey also has an interesting take on 
Sarbanes-Oxley. Macey discusses myriad provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley 
that regulate what he characterizes as the “(contractual) relationship” 
between issuers and their accountants and lawyers. He ultimately supports 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s mandatory rules, over more enabling ones, because in 
his view, the new mandates address distortions (i.e., conflicts of interest) 
in the contracting process by which companies engage outside advisors. In 
his view, the distortions had gotten to the point where accountants and 
lawyers “were no longer acting as gatekeepers, but as aiders and abettors, 
and perhaps even primary actors in the misdeeds of their clients,” 
justifying a regulatory response.  
The article I contributed to this Symposium19 links together the supply 
and demand sides of disclosure. My basic point is that more information is 
not necessarily better than less, contrary to a basic tenet of a disclosure-
based regulatory regime like the federal securities laws. “Sunlight is said 
to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 
policeman.”20 But, as I stress, sunlight can also be blinding. Securities 
regulation primarily focuses on the supply side, mandating extensive 
disclosures, which have become more burdensome post-Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Securities regulation pays relatively little attention to how investors and 
securities market professionals use (i.e., search and process) the 
information in making investment decisions. Drawing on decision theory 
and the literature on investor psychology, I argue that people can become 
overloaded and make worse decisions with more information. In 
particular, building on the realization that people are boundedly rational, 
studies show that when faced with complex tasks, such as those involving 
vast quantities of information, people often adopt simplifying decision 
strategies that require less cognitive effort but that are less accurate than 
more complex strategies. The basic intuition of information overload is 
that investors, securities analysts, and others might make better decisions 
by bringing a more complex decision strategy to bear on less information 
than by bringing a simpler decision strategy to bear on more information. 
 19. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for 
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003). 
 
 20. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914) 
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Accordingly, I conclude that the model of mandatory disclosure that says 
more information is better than less might be counterproductive, and I 
evaluate the possibility of scaling back the mandatory disclosure system. 
The stiffest enforcement measures are criminal. Professor Brickey’s 
article21 argues that Sarbanes-Oxley’s criminal provisions make 
“significant strides toward piercing the veil of corporate silence.” (Putting 
her argument in context, Brickey catalogues the major criminal securities 
and accounting fraud prosecutions the recent scandals have led to, such as 
those arising out of Enron, WorldCom, ImClone, Adelphia, and Tyco.) 
Brickey observes that insiders—including a company’s officers and 
employees, as well as its lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers—
are particularly valuable to the successful prosecution of complex financial 
frauds, and thus a linchpin in the effective enforcement of the federal 
securities laws, because insiders can provide a useful “roadmap” of what 
happened, as Sherron Watkins did at Enron. Brickey identifies two key 
features of Sarbanes-Oxley that encourage individuals to cooperate with 
federal prosecutors. First, Sarbanes-Oxley affords corporate 
whistleblowers important legal protections, although they still remain 
subject to being shunned and shamed at the office. Brickey is realistic, 
however, in her assessment of the impact of the whistleblower protections, 
wondering out loud whether Watkins, for example, would have taken 
“action that she feared would doom the corporation and put the livelihoods 
of thousands of people at risk” by blowing the whistle on Enron instead of 
operating within the company’s chain of command as she did. The second 
change Sarbanes-Oxley brings about concerns cooperating witnesses. In 
particular, the legislation toughens criminal fraud penalties and directs that 
the sentencing guidelines be revised to require longer sentences for 
securities fraud. The risk of a long prison term can in turn be leveraged to 
induce witnesses to cooperate. At bottom, for both whistleblowers and 
potential cooperating witnesses, Sarbanes-Oxley changes the risk/reward 
tradeoff of assisting the government in pursuing securities fraud.  
Professor Krawiec turns her attention to internal compliance.22 Because 
the law is necessarily incomplete, according to Krawiec, effective 
enforcement requires companies to establish self-enforcement 
mechanisms. Lawmakers cannot foresee every eventuality or solution and 
thus defer, if only out of necessity, to businesses and their advisors to fill 
 21. Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime after Sarbanes-
Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357 (2003). 
 22. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 
WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003). 
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in the gaps. Krawiec, pointing to a growing body of empirical studies, 
argues that internal compliance regimes do not effectively deter prohibited 
conduct and may serve as little more than “window-dressing” that 
provides both “market legitimacy and reduced legal liability.” In short, 
parties to the internal compliance process, including division managers, 
compliance personnel, legal departments, outside counsel, and consultants, 
are able to exploit the law’s incompleteness by developing gap-filling 
strategies that serve each party’s own self-interests as part of the ongoing 
renegotiation (i.e., implementation and enforcement) of the law. Two 
problems arise, in Krawiec’s view: first, corporate misdeeds may be 
underdeterred; and second, resources are wasted on ineffective internal 
compliance efforts. She is especially critical of the extent to which the 
legal system gives companies a liability break if they have an internal 
compliance structure in place. The implication of Krawiec’s argument is 
that legal regimes should be less reliant on self-regulation, which, of 
course, suggests a need for more rigorous enforcement of stricter laws. As 
Krawiec puts it, “[T]he poor empirical showing of internal compliance 
structures, combined with the opportunities (highlighted by the Incomplete 
Contracts Governance Theory) for private parties to appropriate any social 
benefits created by legal policy, should cause a more cautious approach to 
such proposals than is currently evidenced in the legal literature.”  
In his remarks, Stephen Cutler, Director of the SEC Division of 
Enforcement, underscores the importance of effective securities law 
enforcement.23 Instead of focusing on any particular feature of 
enforcement, Cutler focuses on a bigger picture concern—namely, the 
“contemporary federal/state cooperation in the securities regulation arena.” 
Against the backdrop of a long tradition of state “blue sky” laws, the 
states, led by New York Attorney General Spitzer, have stepped up their 
efforts to regulate securities markets post-Enron. Just as many have 
expressed concern that the federal government has begun to federalize 
corporate law, others, as Cutler observes, have expressed concern that the 
states are assuming too great of a role in regulating securities markets. 
Although Cutler ultimately gives a nod to the dual regulatory regime that 
governs U.S. securities markets, he seems unprepared to cede much 
authority, cautioning that “as federal regulators, we must acknowledge the 
value of the states’ enforcement firepower, and, in return, prevail upon our 
state counterparts to recognize that when a state enforcement matter 
 
 23. Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
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implicates a competing federal regulatory interest, consultation and 
cooperation with the [SEC] may be critical.” The “mutual goal” of state 
and federal regulators, as he sees it, is to “avoid re-balkanizing” the 
securities markets, which argues for a single, dominant federal regulator to 
deal with national issues affecting our securities markets. 
The overlapping regulatory regime that Cutler describes stands in 
contrast to proposals favoring issuer choice. When it comes to granting 
issuers more choice among competing regulatory regimes, the recent 
scandals call into question whether a market-oriented approach to 
securities regulation is effective. Indeed, the U.S. response has been more 
regulation and enforcement on every level. On the other hand, it should be 
noted that Enron et al. also indict the U.S. regulatory regime; the scandals 
occurred in a setting of extensive mandatory requirements. And as 
mentioned earlier, there has been a strong market-based response to the 
recent scandals, as advocates of issuer choice anticipate.  
Returning to Macey’s article, his support of the legal mandates of 
Sarbanes-Oxley that remedy market failures by improving the contracting 
process between companies and their outside advisors can be read as 
favoring a legal response that is ultimately consistent with “free-market 
solutions.” Markets cannot function without some substantive law and 
legal institutions supporting them. By solving contracting problems, the 
legal system can better assure that the very gatekeepers the market 
depends on to hold management accountable and to “price” governance 
structures and regulatory regimes perform their functions in good faith, 
independently, and with due care. In this sense, some law—even 
mandatory law—is necessary for issuer choice.  
As Professor Sale points out, the goal of securities regulation is not 
disclosure itself, but “quality disclosure.”24 Any consideration of issuer 
choice, therefore, must consider how the quality of the disclosures made 
within it will be evaluated. Sale contends that the regulatory regime of 
every jurisdiction depends on gatekeepers to digest information, let alone 
to help structure the underlying transactions. Therefore, before moving 
toward issuer choice, Sale concludes that steps need to be taken to ensure 
that the “gatekeepers are doing their jobs—both here and abroad.” To be 
sure, much of Sarbanes-Oxley and other extensive regulatory reforms and 
enforcement actions attempt to resolve conflicts of interest and other 
gatekeeper problems in the U.S., as Sale notes; but she remains concerned 
that not enough has been done, and she is doubtful that more reforms are 
 24. Hillary A. Sale, Gatekeepers, Disclosure, and Issuer Choice, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 403 (2003). 
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forthcoming from Capitol Hill in the near term, especially with respect one 
key gatekeeper: investment banks.     
In his commentary, Murray Weidenbaum,25 while generally advocating 
choice and competition, suggests a factor that might cut against strong 
form issuer choice. Weidenbaum questions whether investors should face 
a “bewildering variety of corporate reporting systems.” (Indeed, the same 
concern that disfavors having a variety of reporting systems might 
recommend against moving toward more principles-based financial 
reporting in the U.S., as Cox proposes.) Weidenbaum goes on to propose a 
moderated “federalism approach,” whereby general global guidelines 
would be adopted that are flexible enough to accommodate variations 
across countries.  
III. CONCLUSION 
This Symposium’s principal contribution is its consideration of the 
future of the mandatory disclosure regime of the federal securities laws 
from a more comprehensive perspective that focuses on a number of parts 
that contribute to a very complex regulatory system. To be sure, more 
work remains to be done. Indeed, the hard look we have given our 
securities markets and how we regulate them lately should continue, even 
when times are good and no scandals are hitting the headlines. Securities 
regulation needs to be nimble and able to accommodate new innovations 
and changing business and investor needs and concerns, which can arise 
when stocks are climbing, as well as when they are crashing. Put 
differently, our regulatory regime must remain “state of the art,” and we 
must anticipate future developments and not simply react to them. 
It is still too early to know what the net impact of Sarbanes-Oxley will 
be on corporate governance and performance. Sarbanes-Oxley imposes a 
number of new governance and disclosure mandates on companies, but at 
a cost that was not fully accounted for when the legislation was passed. 
The true test of Sarbanes-Oxley might not come until the markets and 
regulators become lax during the next bull market. The hope is that by 
having routinized a host of new governance and disclosure practices, 
Sarbanes-Oxley will prevent any wave of scandal from spreading 
throughout the markets. Time will tell. 
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